美國貨幣政策

調控的思想是逆經濟風險行事，衰退時降低準備率和再貼現率，公開市場買入；繁榮時則反過來操作。

準備金制度原本為了保障商業銀行的流動性，後來演變成控制商業銀行信用創造的工具。

美國貨幣政策的實質是服務於本國經濟，美聯儲深刻理解美國資產泡沫是美國多年擴張的貨幣造成的，主觀上希望泡沫永遠不會破裂，另一方面通過微調美國經濟、消化歷史包袱。

貨幣政策的運用存在著認識時滯、決策時滯和生效時滯，然後使得正確的政策在錯誤的時間發生作用，不是“熨平”，而是擴大經濟的波幅。30年代的大危機據說就是貨幣政策的失誤造成，90年代初格利斯潘的調控實踐也不很成功。

1、40－50年代初。1941年，美聯儲為籌措軍費，採取了廉價的貨幣政策，即釘住戰前的低利率：三個月期的國庫券利率為0.375%，長期財政債券利率2.4%。無論什麼時候，只要利率上升到高於上述水平，而且債券價格開始下跌時，美聯儲就進行公開市場購買，迫使利率下降。這一政策在大部分時間內是成功的，但當1950年朝鮮戰爭爆發時，引起了通貨膨脹。1951年3月，美聯儲和財政部達成“一致協議”，取消釘住利率，但美聯儲承諾它將不讓利率急劇上升。同時，美聯儲正式獨立於財政部，此後貨幣政策才開始具有完全的獨立性，這也標誌著美國貨幣政策開始成為影響美國經濟的主導力量。

2、50－70年代。這期間美國經濟周期性擴張和收縮的特徵非常突出，因此，擴張性貨幣政策和緊縮性的貨幣政策交替也很明顯，貨幣政策目標經常變化。50年代，美聯儲控制的中介指標有自由儲備金凈額、三個月期的國庫券利率和貨幣總量比，並按此次序來決定指標控制的重要性。結果表明，美聯儲對前兩個指標的控制較好，對貨幣總量控制較差，這導致最初的10年內競發生了三次經濟危機。到了60年代，又重新推行廉價的貨幣政策，同時重視財政政策的運用。貨幣供應量的增長率日趨上升，松的貨幣政策加之松的財政政策導致通貨膨脹率不斷上升，從1965年的2.3%到1969年的6.1%。這些政策進一步導致了70年代滯脹的發生。70年代，美聯儲將貨幣總量作為中間目標，從M1 和M2的增長率來看，美聯儲以緊縮的貨幣政策為主，最終導致了1979年的經濟危機。

3、80－90年代。70年代后，隨著通貨膨脹被抑制，美聯儲又轉向了平穩利率政策，並獲得了極大成功。例如90年代初，美國經濟陷入蕭條，美聯儲在1990年7月到1992年9月間連續逐步降息17次，將短期利率從8%降到3%，促進投資與消費上升，從而帶動了整個經濟的發展。在1994年到1995年7月，美國經濟過熱時，又連續7次提高聯邦基金利率，成功地實現了軟著陸。1994年美聯儲主席格林斯潘指出，美聯儲將放棄以貨幣供應量的增減對經濟實行宏觀調控的做法，今後將以調控實際利率作為經濟調控的主要手段。這標誌著美國貨幣政策的重大轉變。

4、目前。自1999年6月開始，為防止經濟過熱，美聯儲開始抽緊銀根，半年中先後三次提高利率。但美國經濟增長勢頭仍沒有減緩的跡象，於是在2000年2月2日、3月21日和5月16日又分別提高利率，使聯邦基金利率達到65%。5月底公布的數據表明力度加大的宏觀調控開始見效，經濟增長逐步放緩。但2001年伊始，種種跡象表明，美國經濟已進入了明顯放慢的敏感時期。為刺激經濟回升，從1月至6月底，美聯儲連續六次降息。在這麼短的時間內採取如此大的降息動作，是近20年來的第一次。目前，美國聯邦基金利率和貼現率分別為3.75%和3.25%，均為7年多來的最低水平。美聯儲表示，美國經濟今後一段時期面臨的主要危險仍是疲軟，這意味著美聯儲可能還會降息。雖然目前美國經濟還沒有明顯好轉的跡象，但大多數經濟學家認為，下半年美國經濟形勢將會出現好轉。因為，首先，利率調整通常需要6至9個月的時間才能對經濟產生全面影響。這意味著美聯儲今年1月開始的降息行動將在下半年充分發揮作用。其次，布希政府已開始實施其大規模減稅計劃。根據這一計劃，美國家庭下半年可獲得450億美元的減稅。再次，美國的消費者信心已開始回升，個人消費開支可望繼續增加。

從美聯儲提供的1971呈2001年美國GDP增長、生產力水平和物價走勢圖可以看出：90年代中後期是美國經濟最活躍的時期，在此期間，美國經濟持續保持高速增長，通貨膨脹率也控制在較低幅度，生產力水平的增長超過了30年的平均水平。在美國過去十年經濟高速增長時期，一個很顯著的特徵是各類投資基金髮展迅速。風險投資基金的發展，有力支持了新興企業特別是高科技企業不斷成長壯大；併購基金的發展，加快了企業的兼并重組，使一大批企業加快轉型步伐，更多的由傳統行業轉向半導體、電信、信息技術等新興產業，居民及企業投資意願旺盛。

隨著經濟快速增長，1998年以來，美國經濟也不同程度上出現投資過度、投機增加等泡沫經濟現象，一些新興企業股價被嚴重高估，如從事信息網路業務的亞馬遜公司的股票市值在一段時間竟與通用公司的市值幾乎相當，嚴重背離了實際情況。為了防止經濟進一步過熱，美聯儲在兩年曾連續7次提高貸款利息，促使市場修正過熱的經濟預期，導致美國股市回落，企業投資特別是高新技術領域投資明顯下降，經濟增長逐步趨緩。

2000年第四季度開始，美國經濟增長出現停滯之勢。2000年以來，為了防止經濟衰退，提升企業和個人投資意願，促進經濟增長，尤其是振興“9·1l”事件后遭受重大打擊的美國經濟，美聯儲又連續11次降息，美元一年期浮動利率從原來的6.5%下降到1.75%，以刺激居民消費和投資的增長。美聯儲有關官員認為：從近30年來美國生產力水平曲線圖可以看出，這次美國經濟衰退與歷史上其他時期的經濟衰退有所不同。由於美國生產力水平仍保持在基本高於平均增長值狀況，競爭力仍屬較高水平，因此美國經濟有望在今年下半年開始復甦，並逐步進入新一輪增長。

Judd, Rudebusch

下面是一封舊金山聯邦儲備銀行的經濟學通信。裡面談到了美國的貨幣政策目標及其歷史演變。1913年，美聯儲成立的時候，沒有規定目標，只說它的作用是維持貨幣彈性。1946年《就業法》規定美聯儲的貨幣政策目標是促進最大就業。1977年和1978年的《全面就業和預算平衡法》規定，貨幣政策有三個：“完全就業，價格穩定，中長期利率平穩”。現在，正在爭論是否將貨幣政策目標只減為保持價格穩定這一項。歐洲央行已經這樣做了。

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FRBSF Economic Letter

99-04; January 29, 1999

The Goals of U.S. Monetary Policy

* The evolution of the Fed's legislative mandate * The debate about the Fed's current mandate * References

The Federal Reserve has seen its legislative mandate for monetary policy change several times since its founding in 1913, when macroeconomic policy as such was not clearly understood. The most recent revisions were in 1977 and 1978, and they require the Fed to promote both price stability and full employment. The past changes in the mandate appear to reflect both economic events in the U.S. and advances in understanding how the economy functions. In the twenty years since the Fed's mandate was last changed, there have been further important economic developments as well as refinements in economic thought, and these raise the issue of whether to modify the goals for U.S. monetary policy once again. Indeed, a number of other countries--notably those that adopted the Euro as a common curency at the start of this year--have accepted price stability as the new primary goal for their monetary policies.

In this Letter, we spell out the evolution of the legislation governing U.S. monetary policy goals and summarize the debate about whether they could be improved.

The evolution of the Fed's legislative mandate

The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did not incorporate any macroeconomic goals for monetary policy, but instead required the Fed to "provide an elastic currency." This meant that the Fed should help the economy avoid the financial panics and bank runs that plagued the 19th century by serving as a "lender of last resort," which involved making loans directly to depository institutions through the discount windows of the Reserve Banks. During this early period, most of the actions of monetary policy that affected the macro economy were determined by the U.S. government's adherence to the gold standard.

The trauma of the Great Depression, coupled with the insights of Keynes (1936), led to an acknowledgment of the obligation of the federal government to prevent recessions. The Employment Act of 1946 was the first legislative statement of these macroeconomic policy goals. Although it did not specifically mention the Federal Reserve, it required the federal government in general to foster "conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities ... for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."

The Great Inflation of the 1970s was the next major U.S. economic dislocation. This problem was addressed in a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, which provided the first explicit recognition of price stability as a national policy goal. The amended Act states that the Fed "shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." The goals of "stable prices" and "moderate long-term interest rates" are related because nominal interest rates are boosted by a premium over real rates equal to expected future inflation. Thus, "stable prices" will typically produce long-term interest rates that are "moderate."

The objective of "maximum" employment remained intact from the 1946 Employment Act; however, the interpretation of this term may have changed during the intervening 30 years. Immediately after World War II, when conscription and price controls had produced a high-pressure economy with very low unemployment in the U.S., some perhaps believed that the goal of "maximum" employment could be taken in its mathematical sense to mean the highest possible level of employment. However, by the second half of the 1970s, it was well understood that some "frictional" unemployment, which involves the search for new jobs and the transition between occupations, is a necessary accompaniment to the proper functioning of the economy in the long run.

This understanding went hand in hand in the latter half of the 1970s with a general acceptance of the Natural Rate Hypothesis, which implies that if policy were to try to keep employment above its long-run trend permanently or, equivalently, the unemployment rate below its natural rate, then inflation would be pushed higher and higher. Policy can temporarily reduce the unemployment rate below its natural rate or, equivalently, boost employment above its long-run trend. However, persistently attempting to maintain "maximum" employment that is above its long-run level would not be consistent with the goal of stable prices.

Thus, in order for maximum employment and stable prices to be mutually consistent goals, maximum employment should be interpreted as meaning maximum sustainable employment, referred to also as "full employment." Moreover, although the Fed has little if any influence on the long-run level of employment, it can attempt to smooth out short-run fluctuations. Accordingly, promoting full employment can be interpreted as a countercyclical monetary policy in which the Fed aims to smooth out the amplitude of the business cycle.

This interpretation of the Fed's mandate was later confirmed in the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation. As its official title--the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978--clearly implies, this legislation mandates the federal government generally to "...promote full employment and production, increased real income, balanced growth, a balanced Federal budget, adequate productivity growth, proper attention to national priorities, achievement of an improved trade balance . . . and reasonable price stability..." (italics added).

Besides clarifying the general goal of full employment, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act also specified numerical definitions or targets. The Act specified two initial goals: an unemployment rate of 4% for full employment and a CPI inflation rate of 3% for price stability. These were only "interim" goals to be achieved by 1983 and followed by a further reduction in inflation to 0% by 1988; however, the disinflation policies during this period were not to impede the achievement of the full-employment goal. Thereafter, the timetable to achieve or maintain price stability and full employment was to be defined by each year's Economic Report of the President.

The debate about the Fed's current mandate

The Fed then has two main legislated goals for monetary policy: promoting full employment and promoting stable prices. With this mandate, the Fed has helped foster the exceptional performance of the U.S. economy during the past decade. Still, some have argued that the Fed's mandate could be improved, especially in looking ahead to future attempts to maintain or institutionalize recent low inflation. Much discussion has centered on two topics: the transparency of the goals and their dual nature.

The transparency of goals refers to the extent to which the objectives of monetary policy are clearly defined and can be easily and obviously understood by the public. The goal of full employment will never be very transparent because it is not directly observed but only estimated by economists with limited precision. For example, the 1997 Economic Report of the President (which has authority in this matter from the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) gives a range of 5 to 6% for the unemployment rate consistent with full employment, with a midpoint of 5.5%. Research suggests that there is a very wide range of uncertainty around any estimate of the natural rate, with one prominent study finding a 95% probability that it falls in the wide range of 4 to 7-1/2 % (see Walsh 1998).

Price stability as a goal is also subject to some ambiguity. Recent economic analysis has uncovered systematic biases, say, on the order of 1 percentage point, in the CPI's measurement of inflation (see Motley 1997). In this case, actual price stability would be consistent with measured inflation of 1%. In addition, at any point in time, different price indexes register different rates of inflation. Over the past year, for example, the CPI has risen about 1-1/2%, while the GDP price index has risen about 1%. Still, a transparent price stability goal could be specified as a precise numerical growth rate (or range) for a particular index (which could take into account any biases). However, economists have also suggested other ways to enhance the transparency of policy. For example, publishing medium-term inflation forecasts might help to clarify the direction of policy (Rudebusch and Walsh 1998). Because the central bank has some control over inflation in the medium term, its forecasts would contain an indication of where it wanted inflation to go.

A second recent proposed modification to the Fed's goals involves focusing to a larger extent on price stability and de-emphasizing business cycle stabilization. Some economists have argued that having dual goals will lead to an inflation bias despite the Fed's best attempts to control inflation. This argument stresses that the temptation to engineer gains in output in the short run will overcome the central bank's desire to control inflation in the long run. As a result of elevated inflation expectations of the public, inflation will end up being higher than the central bank intended, despite its best efforts. This "time-inconsistency" argument, as economists call it, coupled with the pain incurred in the 1970s as inflation skyrocketed and in the early 1980s as inflation was reduced to moderate levels, persuaded many that the primary goal of the central bank should be to stabilize prices.

This view is embodied in the charter for the central bank in the new European Monetary Union: "The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks is to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community." Among these latter policies are "a high level of employment" and "a balanced development of economic activities."

Economists remain divided on the importance of the time inconsistency problem and on the need to put primary emphasis on price stability at the expense of output stabilization. Some stress the fact that the central bank is the only entity that can guarantee price stability, and that this goal is not likely to be attained for long unless price stability is designated as the primary goal. Others find the arguments for time inconsistency implausible because policymakers, who are aware of the arguments about an inflationary bias and see the implications for inflation, can conduct policy without an inflationary bias (McCallum 1995). Still others argue that the abdication of other goals is irresponsible (Fuhrer 1997). Also, a good deal of empirical research using simulations of models of the U.S. economy suggests that a focus on dual goals can reduce the variance of real GDP (i.e., smooth the business cycle) while achieving an inflation goal as well (Rudebusch and Svensson 1998).

While these issues are not yet resolved, the experience of the past two decades provides some support to those who think dual goals that lack transparency can function successfully. It is true that some countries around the world have reduced inflation over this period while putting primary emphasis on explicit inflation targeting. But at the same time, with its current legislative mandate, the Fed also has had success in reducing inflation, while maintaining the flexibility of responding to business cycle conditions.

John P. Judd Vice President and Associate Director of Research

Glenn D. Rudebusch Research Officer References

Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. 1997. "Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?" New England Economic Review January/February, pp.20-36. Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Harcourt, Brace, and Company: New York.

McCallum, Bennett. 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 85, no. 2 (May), pp. 207-211.

Motley, Brian. 1997. "Bias in the CPI: Roughly Wrong or Precisely Wrong." FRBSF Economic Letter 97-16 (May 23).

Rudebusch, Glenn D., and Lars E.O. Svensson. 1998. "Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting." NBER Working Paper 6512.

Rudebusch Glenn D., and Carl E. Walsh. 1998. "U.S. Inflation Targeting: Pro and Con." FRBSF Economic Letter 98-18 (May 29).

Walsh, Carl E. 1998. "The Natural Rate, NAIRU, and Monetary Policy." FRBSF Economic Letter 98-28 (September 18).